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Book Review: Frontline Ukraine: Crisis in the Borderlands by
Richard Sakwa
In Frontline Ukraine: Crisis in the Borderlands, Richard Sakwa examines the contemporary crisis in Ukraine
centred on the disputed territory of Crimea and the eastern regions. Sakwa traces the origins, developments and
significance of the conflict from the Euromaidan protests up until the parliamentary elections of October 2014. While
Paul Wingrove advises that readers exercise caution and their own judgment when navigating texts on this highly
debated political terrain, he praises Sakwa’s masterful account as a fine-grained, well-sourced analysis.
Frontline Ukraine: Crisis in the Borderlands. Richard Sakwa.  I.B. Tauris. 2015.
Professor Richard Sakwa has authored an exceptional text on the
contemporary crisis in the Ukraine. There are few people as
knowledgeable as he able to weave their way through the thickets of
information and misinformation that surround this question. With Frontline
Ukraine: Crisis in the Borderlands, he offers us a fine-grained, well-
sourced analysis of the background to the 2014 upheavals in Kiev, the
violent course of the events in the Maidan, the Russian annexation of
Crimea, the rebellion in the east of Ukraine, the present state of play and
the prospects for a resolution of Ukraine’s increasingly perilous division.
Sakwa is at home with the minutiae of Ukrainian politics (a matter of
despair for many observers), energy politics, the scheming of Ukraine’s
oligarchs (a matter of even greater despair) as well as with the diplomacy
of the great powers.
In many ways his account does not depart from a general perception of the
problem: that Ukraine is an internally divided state, with that division
overlaid by an international divide which renders Ukraine a state of ‘the
borderlands’ – notably bordering the interests of Washington, Brussels,
NATO, the EU and Moscow. As such, Ukraine is a state whose future is
both domestically and internationally contested, and the resulting conflict is
bitter and intractable.
Throughout the text Sakwa refers to the internal Ukrainian division as one between ‘monists’ and ‘pluralists’ (a term
which here has to have a quite restricted meaning): broadly, that is, between full-throttle Ukrainian nationalists and
those who would allow more official diversity in a state which is, by any standards, already quite diverse. Roughly
speaking, this division accords with the present east-west political and military division of contemporary Ukraine.
Thus: ‘Although the revolution was undoubtedly a complex and contradictory one, at its heart was a monist vision of
Ukrainian statehood that denied the pluralist alternative demanded by the Donbas insurgents.’
Yet Sakwa believes that the international forces which stand behind this division have contributed most to the
ferocity and barely containable dynamics of the conflict. Here he notably rejects Andrew Wilson’s view that the
Ukraine crisis largely results from Russia’s ambitions and intentions towards the (once) Soviet periphery; rather, he
argues that there was an ‘unbalanced’ end to the Cold War, which has ‘generated a cycle of conflict’, injecting a
‘competitive dynamic’ into European international relations. And he rather deplores the fact that much discussion of
the Ukraine crisis looks for a scapegoat (Russia, as it happens) when, in fact, what are at work are ‘structural
contradictions in the international system’.
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In particular, the unbalanced end of the Cold War saw both the expansion of NATO and the enlargement of the
European Union, and it is particularly the convergence of these elements (especially as perceived by Russia) after
2009 that provides the context for the Ukraine crisis. A triumphant NATO-EU system seemed to demand that Russia
acknowledge both its Cold War defeat and consequent post-Cold War status, and in so doing, refused recognition of
its, arguably, legitimate interests in Ukraine.
More to the point, in the post-Cold War era, neither NATO nor the EU has sought, honestly, to establish security
structures within which Russia could be accommodated as an equal – although with quite definite interests of its
own. This is a reasonable argument, but there are still some difficult questions here: what are Russia’s interests?
How easily can the historical legacy of the Cold War be cast off? And how compatible are values across Europe?
Although Sakwa himself does not ‘scapegoat’, his language can be quite stark, and he focuses very much on the
way in which the USA/NATO and the EU have behaved. There are a significant number of references to a ‘war party’
in Washington, while the EU – despite its normative mission – is, at least in some of its parts, a mere appendage to
the USA (‘the war party and its acolytes in the EU’), and in consequence more likely to provoke division in Europe
than reduce it. Indeed, ‘ […] the EU has spectacularly failed. Instead of a vision embracing the whole continent, it
has become little more than the civilian wing of the Atlantic security alliance.’
As for Russia: ‘[a]ny state in Russia’s position has certain security and other concerns, and as long as they are
respected, normal business can be conducted. Instead it appeared that the war party sought to provoke and exploit
conflicts between Russia and its neighbours, threatening to lay waste the whole post-Soviet region.’ Just as
forcefully, Sakwa writes that ‘[N]ot only was Europe divided, but relations between two countries [Ukraine and
Russia] that shared  a long, although troubled, history had soured in a spectacular manner. This rests on the
conscience of the current generation of Atlantic and Eastern European leaders.’ And Sakwa also cites the (now)
Director of Communications for Jeremy Corbyn, Seumas Milne, to the effect that: ‘ […] NATO and the EU, not
Russia, sparked this crisis – and […] it’s the Western powers that are resisting the negotiated settlement that is the
only way out, for fear of appearing weak.’ So at least we know where the blame lies.
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Sakwa’s scholarship is admirable and not easily contestable. Only here and there did I raise a cautious eyebrow. 
Thus, on page 90, we have a remark to the effect that it was ‘discovered’ that the EU had spent 496 million Euros
between 2004 and 2013 on ‘subsidising front groups’ in Ukraine – this seemed to me to be such an intriguing figure
that I had a second look at it. The relevant endnote refers to a piece written by Patrick Armstrong – but Armstrong, in
turn, is citing Christopher Booker writing in the Daily Telegraph, who is quoting from Richard North’s EU blog, which
then refers us to data obtained from the EU Financial Transparency System. Having looked at that data myself, I can
only remark that things seem to be, shall we say, somewhat less clear-cut than you might think.
Russia’s basic aim is to keep Ukraine out of NATO, writes Sakwa, and a solution to the present crisis would seem to
revolve around that element – neutrality in foreign relations – and a degree of federalism internally for Ukraine.
Assuming that is all that Russia seeks – and this in itself is one of the dynamics – we still have to ask if the external
parties trust each other enough to believe that this is a solution that might hold? And do the domestic parties have
the requisite trust in each other (and their external sponsors) to the point where arms can be put to one side?
Frankly, at the moment, that seems unlikely. Sakwa’s structural analysis leads to this gloomy conclusion: ‘The gloves
are now off and a new period of confrontation will continue until there is a change of leaders or paradigms or both.’
Sakwa has given us a masterful recounting of events of great complexity in Frontline Ukraine.  But in reading any
work on the Ukraine conflict, with its great diversity of interpretation, it is naturally important to proceed with a degree
of  caution, and calmly decide for yourself what the evidence stacks up to.
Paul Wingrove was formerly Senior Lecturer in Politics at the University of Greenwich. Read more reviews by Paul
Wingrove.
Note: This review gives the views of the author, and not the position of the LSE Review of Books blog, or of the
London School of Economics. 
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